Bob
Travica
Idealism Won't End
It
By James R. Schlesinger
Washington
Post, Wednesday, March 31, 1999; Page A29
It is astonishing
that those who spent decades recounting the "lessons of
Vietnam" have
themselves failed to heed those lessons. Forgotten now are the
injunction not
to intervene in civil wars and the admonitions regarding the
strength of
nationalism. Slobodan Milosevic is under far greater pressure to
avoid ceding
control over Kosovo than Ho Chi Minh was to abandon his goal of
absorbing South
Vietnam. "Signaling" the seriousness of our intent through
bombing was
not a sure-fire way of overcoming resistance in Vietnam -- nor
is it in Serbia.
Nor are our longer-run purposes clear. In Bosnia, we bombed
the Serbs because
they sought self-determination; we are now bombing other
Serbs because
they refuse to allow self-determination for the Kosovars.
What are our
objectives? Presumably, they are to weaken Milosevic, to
protect the
Kosovars, to stabilize the region and to prevent the conflict
from spilling
over Yugoslavia's borders. Can these objectives be achieved
through the
means chosen? Not likely. Our instrument was to threaten to bomb
Serbia until
it accepted the agreement that we and our allies hammered out
at Rambouillet
-- and then persuaded the Kosovars (at least temporarily) to
accept. Unless
Milosevic was prepared to yield control over Kosovo, a deeply
emotional symbol
of Serb nationhood, he had at most a few weeks to subdue
Kosovo. For
those who know the history of Serbia in this past century, his
response should
have caused no surprise. Nationalism, we learn again, is a
powerful force.
The Serbs have rallied around Milosevic. Rather than
protecting the
Kosovars, we have triggered the very outcome we sought to
avoid. Far more
intimidation, repression and deaths will follow in the weeks
ahead than in
the period up to now.
And we have ensured
that the conflict will spill over the borders of
Yugoslavia --
partly from the pressures of the refugees and partly from our
reported intent
to use Macedonia as a launching platform for our
helicopters.
Up to now, objectives and our means have been sadly mismatched.
Demonizing Milosevic
may be satisfying, but it is scarcely an effective
strategy.
How do we define
the American interest? Since coming into office in 1993,
the administration
has regularly -- and quite sensibly -- stated that
getting along
with Russia (sometimes referred to as our "strategic partner")
is a major determinant
of our policy. Yet we decide to bomb the Serbs and to
ignore the Russian
reaction, thereby forcing Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov
-- en route
to Washington -- to turn his aircraft around as he reached the
Atlantic. This
seems to suggest that the elusive goal of protecting the
Kosovars is
more in the national interest than maintaining amicable
relations with
Russia. That would seem a questionable conclusion -- and
scarcely what
we have heard for these past six years.
The first goal
should be be to stop the violence, the first victims of which
are those we
seek to protect, the Kosovars. To accomplish this, the Serbs
must be convinced
that their own national aspirations will be taken into
account. To
be sure, we can continue on our present course of attempting to
bomb the Serbs
into submission. It might ultimately be successful -- but
probably too
late. We can do what we have said we won't do: move in ground
forces and impose
our will on a somewhat desolate landscape. But that
probably would
imply a lengthy stay for U.S. ground forces.
Since international
politics, even more than domestic politics, remains the
art of the possible,
we could move toward accepting the emotional realities
of the Balkans
-- and acquiesce in partition and, to the extent necessary,
population separation.
Self-determination is the only aspect of Wilsonianism
that we have
sought to avoid -- with our insistence on imposing an
American-style
multiethnic society on Bosnia and now Yugoslavia. To be sure,
we have not
always been consistent in our rejection of partition or
self-determination.
We embraced it when we encouraged the Croats to expel a
half-million
Serbs, but we never admitted what we were up to.
Neither the
history nor the emotions of the Balkans lend themselves to an
American ideal
of a multiethnic society or to American preachments about
multinationalism.
Indeed, the ideal of multiethnic harmony will be even less
plausible and
more remote after we complete the current phase of bombing.
While it does
imply that we shall have to jettison illusory goals of these
past eight years,
to do so holds out the possibility that we shall be able
to extricate
ourselves and leave conditions that are reasonably stable.
The Serbs in
Bosnia can join with Serbia. The Croats could join with
Croatia. The
rump Bosnian state around Sarajevo should enjoy Western support
and protection.
Milosevic would have something to show the Serb population
as a limited
step toward Greater Serbia -- and it would compensate in part
for the loss
of part of Kosovo, which might go to Albania. In reaching this
outcome, Russia
would have a critical role to play, a place in the sun, and
our relations
with Primakov would be substantially restored.
Unless it coincides
with the national interest, moral indignation is rearely
a sound guide
to policy. We should be guided less by indignation and more by
foresight.
The writer is
a former secretary of defense and director of central
intelligence.
Copyright 1999
The Washington Post Company
Bombs Away
By Michael Kelly
Wednesday, March
31, 1999; Page A29
The most revealing
glimpse of the Clinton administration's thinking, such as
it is, about
Kosovo occurred earlier this month in a private meeting between
the Italian
prime minister and the president. As reported by The Post,
Massimo D'Alema
asked Bill Clinton a simple question about the contemplated
NATO bombing
of Serbia: What would the United States do if Slobodan
Milosevic did
not back down under bombing, and instead increased his
assaults on
the Kosovar Albanians?
The president
was stumped by the question. He did not answer, but turned
inquiringly
to his national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger. Berger
hesitated, and
then replied: "We will continue the bombing."
The Post does
not report whether the Italian prime minister at this point
ran shrieking
from the room, but it would have been understandable if he
had. It must
have been disconcerting to discover that the leader of the
world's sole
superpower was about to launch a war without a plan that
extended beyond
next Sunday's talk shows, or without a thought to one of
bombing's most
likely consequences.
The NATO air
campaign against Serbia began on March 24. By March 29, the
resultant Serb
ground campaign against the Kosovar Albanians had forced at
least 130,000
of them to take refuge in Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia.
Serbian troops
were continuing their systematic campaign against the ethnic
Albanian population,
reportedly bombarding and torching entire villages,
executing civilian
leaders, detaining men of fighting age and sending women
and children
into exile.
This is not the
result that Bill Clinton and his merry band of deep thinkers
expected. In
his March 24 speech to the nation explaining his decision to
bomb, the president
said: "We act to protect thousands of innocent people in
Kosovo from
a mounting military offensive." Whoops-a-daisy.
Administration
officials now are doing what comes naturally to them in these
moments of embarrassment.
They are dissembling. Asked on Monday about news
reports of a
wave of executions of Albanian Kosovars, White House press
secretary Joe
Lockhart said: "We knew he was going to do this." We knew he
was going to
do this? We knew that, if we bombed Serbia, Milosevic would
respond with
a massive killing and cleansing campaign against the very
population we
were going to war to protect?
If so, then the
president and his advisers are guilty of criminal
irresponsibility.
For the United States made no serious efforts to prepare
for what Lockhart
says we knew was coming, a wave of killing and "cleansing"
U.S. officials
now compare to genocide. The president ordered up the bombing
without any
strategy to protect the Albanian Kosovars from resultant attack,
without sufficient
ground strength in the region to even think about
countering the
Serb ground offensive, without even an adequate refugee-aid
plan in place.
But of course
Lockhart is, in the proud tradition of Clinton mouthpieces,
merely uttering
what sounds good in the moment. Others are too. Secretary of
State Madeleine
Albright, who has spent too much time in the company of her
boss, went on
the Sunday talks to suggest that the Serbian army offensive
against the
Kosovar Albanians had been underway before the NATO bombing
campaign and
would have intensified as it did whether or not NATO had
bombed. "I think
that it is just simply an upside-down argument to think
that NATO or
we have made this get worse," Albright said. "To say that this
has now backfired
is just dead wrong."
To hear a secretary
of state mouth such patent nonsense is embarrassing, and
frightening.
Do these people have any idea what they are doing beyond
bombing their
way through another day? Did they really start a war without a
strategy for
coping with the most obvious consequences?
No, and yes.
The American strategy in Kosovo, such as it is, is rooted in a
series of remarkably
careless assumptions: (1) to insist upon a peace accord
that required
Milosevic to accept foreign troops on Serb soil and to place
Kosovo, the
historical and cultural heart of Serbia, on a path to
independence;
(2) to think that Milosevic would swiftly back down in the
face of, or
under the punishment of, bombing; (3) to believe that, if
necessary, we
could pull an Iraq -- declare the bad man's military to be
"degraded" and
go home; (4) to promise at the outset that no American ground
assault was
forthcoming, thus giving Milosevic reason to think that he could
wait out the
bombing -- and that he might as well take the opportunity to
get a spot of
ethnic spring cleansing done.
Michael Kelly
is the editor of National Journal.
Copyright 1999
The Washington Post Company